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Cognitive and psychological flexibility after a traumatic brain injury and the
implications for treatment in acceptance-based therapies: A conceptual review
Abstract
This paper provides a selective review of cognitive and psychological flexibility in the
context of treatment for psychological distress after traumatic brain injury, with a focus
on acceptance-based therapies. Cognitive flexibility is a component of executive function
that is referred to mostly in the context of neuropsychological research and practice.
Psychological flexibility, from a clinical psychology perspective, is linked to health and
wellbeing and is an identified treatment outcome for therapies such as Acceptance and
Commitment Therapy. There are a number of overlaps between the constructs. They both
manifest in the ability to change behaviour (either a thought or an action) in response to
environmental change, with similarities in neural substrate and mental processes.
Impairments in both show a strong association with psychopathology. People with a TBI
often suffer impairments in their cognitive flexibility as a result of damage to areas
controlling executive processes but have a positive response to therapies that promote
psychological flexibility. Overall, psychological flexibility appears a more overarching
construct and cognitive flexibility may be a subcomponent of it but not necessarily a prerequisite. Further research into therapies which claim to improve psychological flexibility
such as ACT needs to be undertaken in TBI populations in order to clarify its utility in
this group.
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Introduction
Flexibility in mental processes has been extensively studied and measured from a
neuropsychological perspective since the late 1940s (Berg, 1948). More recently,
flexibility has become a desired treatment outcome in what has been termed acceptancebased therapies such as Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Villatte,
Levin, & Hildebrandt, 2011). There appears to be similarities in the way psychologists
who undertake cognitive assessments and those who use acceptance-based therapies view
the construct of mental flexibility. For example, there are definitional overlaps and both
groups recognise that impairments in flexibility are strongly associated with
psychopathology (e.g. Berman, Wheaton, McGrath, & Abramowitz, 2010; Bricker,
Wyszynski, Comstock, & Heffner, 2013b).
Despite these similarities, mental flexibility currently appears to be viewed from two
different perspectives within psychology and given separate labels, namely cognitive and
psychological flexibility. However, there has been no formal consideration of the
overlapping theoretical features between these perspectives of mental flexibility. The
construct of cognitive flexibility (sometimes referred to as mental flexibility) has a long
and well developed history and appears to be well understood and validated.
Psychological flexibility has a more recent history arising out of acceptance-based
therapies. With an exponential rise in clinical outcome research that assesses these
therapies, there is a need to develop an improved understanding of the underlying
construct. At the current time, it is unclear whether cognitive and psychological
flexibility are identical, overlapping or entirely separate constructs.
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The nature of the relationship between cognitive and psychological flexibility may
have important clinical implications for interventions that promote psychological
flexibility to address adjustment issues after a traumatic brain injury (TBI). Impairments
in cognitive flexibility have been well established in populations with a brain injury (e.g.
Heled, Hoofien, Margalit, Natovich, & Agranov, 2012; McDonald, Flashman, & Saykin,
2002; Niemeier, Marwitz, Lesher, Walker, & Bushnik, 2007). Therefore if cognitive and
psychological flexibility are the same construct or overlapping, the applicability of these
acceptance-based therapies after a TBI needs further exploration.
Over the past two decades there has been a growing confidence that psychological
therapies can make a significant contribution to the adjustment process after a TBI
despite the range of cognitive impairments characteristic of brain-injured populations
(Bombardier et al., 2009; Cattelani, Zettin, & Zoccolotti, 2010). Initial work has trialled
interventions based on cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) approaches, which rely on
techniques such as cognitive restructuring and improved problem-solving to achieve the
therapeutic benefit (e.g., Ashman, Cantor, Tsaousides, Spielman, & Gordon, 2014;
Simpson, Tate, Whiting, & Cotter, 2011). Acceptance-based therapies, such as
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT: C. Kim, Johnson, Cilles, & Gold, 2011),
have a different therapeutic target. Namely, helping patients experience difficult thoughts
without struggling to change their content, while also persisting with values consistent
behaviour. The fundamental proposition of ACT is that psychological flexibility is a core
mechanism of change that directly contributes to psychological wellbeing (Kashdan &
Rottenberg, 2010). Another key change mechanism within ACT involves helping people
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accept difficult experiences and engage in committed behaviour, in the context of a
values guided life.
There is a growing interest in the potential application of ACT in assisting clients
navigate the complex issues influencing recovery following a TBI (Kangas & McDonald,
2011; Soo, Tate, & Lane-Brown, 2011). For example, ACT might facilitate adaptation
and acceptance of changed functioning and life circumstances following a severe TBI
(Kangas & McDonald, 2011). However, before utilising ACT to treat psychological
distress in individuals with a TBI, the relationship between cognitive flexibility and
psychological flexibility, both conceptually and empirically, should be clarified.
Our fundamental question is whether impaired cognitive flexibility secondary to TBI,
constrains the capacity to develop the psychological flexibility required to cope with the
emotional impact of the injury. Addressing this question may improve our understanding
of current treatments that improve function after TBI and provide additional knowledge
of how acceptance-based therapies may be effective for this population.
To address this aim, the literature relating to cognitive versus psychological flexibility
derived from several lines of inquiry will be reviewed. Specifically, we review research
identifying the constituent mental processes of flexibility; evidence relating to the neural
substrate of flexibility; the clinical implications of inflexibility for psychopathology;
methods for assessing flexibility; and treatment approaches aimed at increasing
flexibility. The focus of the review is on those with severe TBI (Russell & Smith, 1961)
as they are more like to demonstrate larger and more persistent cognitive impairments
than both mild head injury (Schretlen & Shapiro, 2003) and moderate TBI (Guise, 2010).
Furthermore, in severe TBI, impairments can persist for many years after the injury and
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cause ongoing psychological distress (Jennifer M. Fleming & Ownsworth, 2006).
Interventions resulting in improved psychological flexibility with a severe TBI
population are likely to be generalisable to individuals with less severe injuries but not
necessarily vice a versa. However, the literature on severe TBI is limited, therefore
evidence for the review will be drawn from studies of broader acquired brain injury
(ABI), non-brain damaged clinical groups, as well as healthy adults.
An overall summary of the commonalities and differences will then be provided, as
well as findings from the two studies that have sought to investigate the links between
cognitive and psychological flexibility. Finally, implications of the findings from the
review for the psychological treatment in people with severe TBI will be discussed with a
focus on those acceptance-based therapies or interventions that aim to improve
psychological flexibility (e.g., ACT, mindfulness).

Acceptance-based Therapies
Before commencing the review, a brief outline of acceptance-based therapies is needed.
The third wave of behavioural therapies has been referred to as acceptance-based
cognitive behavioural therapies (Forman & Herbert, 2009) and includes ACT, as well as
mindfulness based therapies (e.g., Kabat‐Zinn, 2003). Creating or improving
psychological flexibility is the main focus of these acceptance-based therapies and they
are proposed to be qualitatively different from CBT. Rather than focussing on symptom
reduction, they aim to allow individuals to accept difficult internal and external
experiences while remaining present in their life and not engaging in an avoidant coping
style. Remaining “present” in this context refers to being open and willing to experience
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these (difficult) thoughts and feelings, which in the domain of acceptance-based therapies
is referred to as being more psychologically flexible. Being psychologically flexible in
ACT also includes behavioural activation where despite, or in the presence of these
difficult experiences, the individual is encouraged to engage in activity that is consistent
with their identified values.
The model underpinning ACT proposes there are six core processes involved in
achieving psychological flexibility and these are grouped under two broader categories of
either mindfulness or behaviourally based processes. The six core processes are listed and
defined in Table 1 and diagrammatically represented by a hexaflex (Hayes, Luoma,
Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006) (Figure 1). A number of therapeutic techniques, including
roles plays and metaphors, are used to help target and develop these core processes as the
clinician works in a non-linear manner through the hexaflex.
(insert Figure 1 about here)
(insert Table 1 about here)
Experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion can arise when these processes are not
implemented and results in psychological inflexibility. Experiential avoidance, as
opposed to acceptance, occurs when a person actively attempts to change experiences,
both internal and external, that gives rise to difficult thoughts and emotions. Cognitive
fusion is the process which perpetuates experiential avoidance by causing a person to
become caught in the content of thoughts rather the context in which they occur.
All six core processes in the hexaflex (or psychological flexibility model) contribute to
the development of psychological flexibility but it is not clear what the relative
contribution of each process is and how this may differ with each individual.
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Research indicates that ACT promotes psychological flexibility in a range of contexts and
psychological/health conditions (Ruiz, 2010) but the construct appears to be transitioning
from the ACT framework and being used more broadly in psychology. A challenge in the
interpretation of this research is that aspects of the conceptualisation of the psychological
flexibility construct appears to be still evolving and requires further clarification
(Wolgast, 2014).

Current Conceptualisations of Cognitive and Psychological Flexibility
Mental processes involved in cognitive flexibility
In the neuropsychological literature, cognitive flexibility has been defined as the
ability to change behaviour such as thoughts or actions in response to situational demands
(Cañas, Antoli, Fajardo, & Salmerón, 2005; Lezak, 2004). It is a component of executive
functioning, the group of higher order cognitive abilities that include planning, problem
solving, goal development and achievement (Alvarez & Emory, 2006; Burgess &
Alderman, 2004; Dubois, Slachevsky, Litvan, & Pillon, 2000; Strauss, Sherman, &
Spreen, 2006). These abilities are considered to be essential for purposeful human
behaviour (Lezak, 2004) and can entail spontaneous and reactive components (Eslinger &
Grattan, 1993). The processes underpinning cognitive flexibility are dynamic, involving
cycles of thought generation and suppression that emerge and dissipate as the individual
interacts with changing environmental factors such as contextual cues and task demands
(Ionescu, 2012). This model proposed by Ionescu (2012) has been described as a ‘unified
framework of cognitive flexibility’, involving a number of cognitive components or
mechanisms. These include various executive functions, attention, perception, goal
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parameters and monitoring in conjunction with task demands, contextual cues and
sensorimotor input. Hence, the concept of cognitive flexibility encompasses more than
simple response switching.
Neural substrate of cognitive flexibility
Damage to the frontal lobes of the brain has traditionally been associated with
impairments in the executive functions which are closely linked to the concept of
flexibility (Ownsworth, Clare, & Morris, 2006). Though fractionation of the frontal lobe
is observed for specific tasks there appears to be a more general distribution of activation
across several regions for executive functions (Stuss, 2011). In specific studies, the
activation of neural networks has been mapped in samples of healthy adults undertaking
tasks involving cognitive flexibility. Reviews have indicated both frontal and non-frontal
regions of the brain are activated by tests assessing executive functions (Vowles &
McCracken, 2010). As a specific example of the neurological substrates of cognitive
flexibility in healthy adults, a switching task such as the Trail Making Test Part B, evokes
distinct left sided activation of the dorsolateral and medial frontal regions of the brain as
well as activity in the left middle and superior temporal gyrus (Johansson, Bjuhr, &
Rönnbäck, 2012). This is consistent with the operation of a central executive network
within the brain that subserves this range of behaviours (Sridharan, Levitin, & Menon,
2008) but it is apparent that some fractionation of executive functions on a
neuroanatomical basis is possible. For example, while both the frontal lobes and basal
ganglia have been implicated in tasks involving response-shifting, the basal ganglia is
less implicated in broader cognitive flexibility involving divergent thought and fluency
(Eslinger & Grattan, 1993).
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Expanding the construct to include highly abstract cognitive switching was found to
recruit the anterior pre-frontal cortex (Jennifer M Fleming, Winnington, McGillivray,
Tatarevic, & Ownsworth, 2006). Adding language to cognitive flexibility task, including
tasks such as category switching and verbal fluency, implicates an extensive distributed
network of brain regions. This includes the frontal, temporal and parietal regions in the
left hemisphere and indicates shared neural substrates with working memory, processing
speed and language processing (Bédard et al., 2014). It would appear that even an activity
perceived as relatively simple, such as shifting set, activates a larger network than the
frontal lobes and the complexity of the network of activation increases when the task
involves a language component.
Mental health implications of impairments in cognitive flexibility
Impairments in cognitive flexibility, as measured by a range of neuropsychological
tests, have been identified in a number of psychological disorders and are common after a
TBI. For example, people diagnosed with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder (MartinezAran et al., 2001), generalised anxiety disorder (Fledderus, Bohlmeijer, Fox, Schreurs, &
Spinhoven, 2013), eating disorders (Kabat‐Zinn, 2003; Levin, Hildebrandt, Lillis, &
Hayes, 2012; Steinglass, Walsh, & Stern, 2006), posttraumatic stress disorder (Shields &
Ownsworth, 2013) and obsessive compulsive disorder (Forman & Herbert, 2009), all
show some disruption of flexibility. This provides strong evidence for the suggestion that
inflexibility is a key factor in psychopathology (Johnco, Wuthrich, & Rapee, 2014). In
both eating disorders (Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, & Freedman, 2006) and major depressive
disorder (Deveney & Deldin, 2006), it has been shown that poor cognitive flexibility is
associated with poor response to treatment. Furthermore, in a small sample of females
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with PTSD (n=15), improvements in cognitive flexibility accompanied a decrease in
PTSD symptoms after trauma-focussed psychological treatment (Shields & Ownsworth,
2013).
The question of how cognitive inflexibility contributes to the maintenance of
symptoms in major depressive disorder was explored by Deveny and Deldin (2010).
They found that when individuals with major depressive disorder were exposed to
negative stimuli in the form of negative words (e.g. “agony”); they made more
perseverative errors on the Wisconsin Card Sort Test (WCST), indicative of greater
inflexibility. The controls made more perseverative errors when they were exposed to
positive words (e.g. “admired”). This link between perseverative inflexibility, or
becoming stuck on an idea, and psychopathology is also evident in individuals with a
tendency to ruminate when dysphoric. Supporting the link between rumination and
cognitive flexibility is Davis and Nolen-Hoeksema’s (2000) research showing that
ruminators displayed more perseverative errors and had more difficulty in maintaining set
on the WCST than did non-ruminators.
In TBI, impairments in cognitive flexibility and executive function including problem
solving, planning and abstract thinking are common (Heled et al., 2012). Clinically these
impairments are often a source of treatment difficulties and results in functional
difficulties for many years after the injury (McDonald, et al., 2002). Impairments in
cognitive flexibility have also shown an association with both the understanding of
emotions (i.e., empathy) and expression of emotions in ABI samples (Grattan & Eslinger,
1989; Shamary-Tsoory, Tomer, Berger, & Aharon-Peretz, 2003).
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The same problems are associated with the presence of psychopathology in the TBI
populations. TBI patients diagnosed with major depressive disorder were found to have
greater impairments in cognitive flexibility, as measured by neuropsychological tests
(WCST and TMT), than those without a diagnosis of depression (Jorge et al., 2004).
Impaired executive function, which included neuropsychological measures of cognitive
flexibility (TMT and Verbal Fluency), has also found to be greater in individuals with a
TBI and comorbid anxiety disorder (Gould, Ponsford, & Spitz, 2014). Even though
individuals with a TBI often have impaired cognitive flexibility, this inflexibility appears
to be even higher if they are suffering from significant levels of psychological distress.
Another clinical implication for impairments in cognitive flexibility after a TBI is the
impact of impaired self-awareness. Impaired self-awareness has a complex, multifaceted
relationship with the recovery process after TBI involving neurocognitive, psychological
and socio-environmental factors (Hoofien, Gilboa, Vakil, & Donovick, 2001; Makvand
Hoseini, Rezaei, & Azadi, 2014a; Ownsworth et al., 2007; Ownsworth & McFarland,
2004). A positive relationship has been established between impaired cognitive flexibility
and impaired self-awareness using a range of self-awareness measures and
neuropsychological tests of cognitive flexibility (Chard, Schumm, McIlvain, Bailey, &
Parkinson, 2011; Farb et al., 2007; Guise, 2010; Masuda, Price, Anderson, & Wendell,
2010). This association between cognitive flexibility and self-awareness appears
noteworthy and will be discussed further in the section titled, ‘Implications for
Psychological Treatment after TBI’.
From research with both clinical and TBI groups it appears the relationship between
impairments in cognitive flexibility and psychopathology is multifaceted. Impaired
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cognitive flexibility is a perpetuating factor by contributing to symptom maintenance and
also appears to be a barrier for treatment in terms of impaired self-awareness. Moreover,
the presence of psychopathology and cognitive inflexibility appears to contribute to
broader cognitive decline. Data about causality or directionality of the cognitive
flexibility-psychopathology relationship is not currently available to help guide clinical
interventions. There still needs to be further research to explore whether psychopathology
is an antecedent to, concomitant with or a consequence of cognitive inflexibility or
whether all operate synergistically.
Measuring cognitive flexibility
Measures of cognitive flexibility are divided into task-based objective tests, which
require the participant to demonstrate a certain behavioural response, and self-report
measures. The most recognised task-based test of cognitive flexibility is the Wisconsin
Card Sorting Test (WCST; Heaton, Chelune, Talley, Kay, & Curtiss, 1981). The
cognitive processes underlying the WCST are considered to involve the ability to
maintain a response, problem solving, cognitive flexibility (Greve et al., 2002) and
working memory (Hartman, Steketee, Silva, Lanning, & Andersson, 2003). High
numbers of perseverative errors, where the respondent fails to make changes in their
behaviour in response to feedback, is indicative of cognitive inflexibility or simply the
inability to “shift”, although as previously mentioned cognitive flexibility is recognised as
more than just set shifting.
The Alternate Uses Test (Guilford, Christensen, Merrifield, & Wilson, 1978) is
proposed to measure spontaneous cognitive flexibility (i.e., a generative ability),
providing additional information to the WCST (Bush, Novack, & Schneider, 1999). The
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test requires participants to generate up to six alternate uses for common objects such as a
car tyre. In addition to these tests, components of measures assessing the broader
construct of executive function also appear to assess cognitive flexibility. These include
the Trail Making Test Part B (Kortte, Horner, & Windham, 2002; Reitan, 1958), the
Stroop Test (Strauss et al., 2006) and measures of verbal fluency (Borkowski, Benton, &
Spreen, 1967) among others. Ionescu (2012), provides a comprehensive review of taskbased measures of cognitive flexibility for both adults and children.
In addition to these neuropsychological measures of cognitive flexibility, there have
been self-report measures developed which are described as assessing cognitive
flexibility. Their development has arisen from the requirement to quantify cognitive
therapy efficacy and appear to have a very different focus than the traditional objective
task-based cognitive measures already described. Recent cross validation between
neuropsychological measures of cognitive flexibility and self-report measures have
indicated predominantly weak relationships between them (Johnco et al., 2014),
suggesting that they are not measuring the same construct or cognitive process.
Despite the weak association with task-based measures of cognitive flexibility, they
may provide a link to the construct of psychological flexibility as they have been
developed from a clinical psychology perspective. These self-report measures include the
Cognitive Flexibility Inventory (CFI: Dennis & Vander Wal, 2010) and the Cognitive
Flexibility Scales (CFS: Bilgin, 2009; Martin & Rubin, 1995). The CFI has been
developed to measure the flexibility required to adequately challenge unhelpful thought
processes as promoted in CBT and has a problem solving orientation. The CFS for adults
encompasses behavioural concepts including “an awareness of options and alternatives, a
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willingness to be flexible and adapt to the situation and self-efficacy in being flexible”
(Martin & Rubin, 1995 p. 623). The CFS for adolescents (Bilgin, 2009) purports to
measure the flexibility of adolescents with regard to themselves, others and their
environment by having respondents rate opposite adjective pairs (e.g., cowardly/brave;
bad/good) on a five point Likert scale.
The goal of these self-report measures encompasses a broader spectrum of cognitive
flexibility than neuropsychological task-based measures which are reductionist, assessing
quite focussed tasks. If both these types of measures are assessing cognitive flexibility, it
suggests that the construct is broader than what is implied by the use of traditional taskbased cognitive tests alone.
Treating impairments in cognitive flexibility
Treatments targeting impairments in cognitive flexibility are subsumed by the broader
treatment of executive dysfunction and both cognitive remediation and pharmacological
interventions have yielded improvements in executive function after a TBI (McDonald, et
al., 2002). The efficacy of pharmacological interventions are mixed and medications do
not target specific cognitive deficits (Schillerstrom, 2009). Although initial findings from
cognitive remediation are positive, it is a costly, intensive intervention requires a high
number of treatment sessions (e.g., 40) in order to ensure skill development and
behavioural change. Also, skill development from cognitive remediation training has
shown limited generalisability to functional real-world settings (Cicerone et al., 2000).
Looking at studies which included a more heterogeneous sample, improvements in
cognitive flexibility were demonstrated in an ABI sample which included a proportion of
participants with TBI (n=33/75) (Tagliaferri, Compagnone, Korsic, Servadei, & Kraus,
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2006). The study investigated various executive functions of which flexibility was one
component. Two groups received different types of cognitive training (20-24 one hour
sessions). Both groups demonstrated similar improvements in flexibility over time as
measured by the Stroop Test but there were no significant differences found between the
two groups.
Shorter treatment programs (five sessions) though have also been found to be effective
in improving executive function after a TBI using a task shifting exercise (Stablum,
Umiltà, Mazzoldi, Pastore, & Magon, 2007). A review of treatments to address
impairments in cognitive flexibility in other clinical populations (schizophrenia,
pathological gambling, anorexia nervosa) indicates that both pharmacological
interventions (Grant, Chamberlain, Odlaug, Potenza, & Kim, 2010; Pardo et al., 2011)
and cognitive remediation (Delahunty, Morice, & Frost, 1993; Tchanturia, Davies, &
Campbell, 2007; Wykes et al., 2007) can be effective.
In summary, there is evidence that cognitive remediation maybe effective for
impairments in executive functions (Cicerone et al., 2011). Treatments that specifically
target impairments in cognitive flexibility after a TBI need development (Chung, Pollock,
Campbell, Durward, & Hagen, 2013) and how this links with psychopathology also
merits further investigation.
Mental processes involved in psychological flexibility
Psychological flexibility is defined as the ability to connect with the present moment
and experience the thoughts and feelings without unhelpful defense, and to persist in
action that is consistent with values, or change that action when the situation demands (C.
Kim et al., 2011). This conceptualisation incorporates the behavioural component of
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committed action, which makes psychological flexibility more comprehensive than just
acceptance (Bond et al., 2011). It also appears to be independent of other constructs of
psychological distress, such as anxiety and depression, as defined by symptom based selfreport measures (Gloster, Klotsche, Chaker, Hummel, & Hoyer, 2011). This definition
has two components, acceptance and a behavioural component of committed action. The
latter component seems to be consistent with how cognitive flexibility is defined
suggesting at a definitional level, cognitive flexibility is a component of psychological
flexibility.
Kashdan and Rottenberg (2010), provide a broad conceptualisation of psychological
flexibility where they delineate three core components. The first component is executive
functioning such as the ability to rapidly shift cognitive set and thereby attention,
indicating overlap with the construct of cognitive flexibility. The other two components
relate to the individual’s ability to achieve a balanced or default state (namely a type of
psychological equilibrium) and underlying personality traits such as neuroticism, positive
affect, openness to experience and self-control.
Despite psychological flexibility being represented as a multicomponent construct
(Figure 1), results from factor analysis of instruments such as the Acceptance and Action
Questionnaire-II (AAQ-II; Bond et al., 2011), designed to assess the six core processes
targeted in ACT, are best explained by a one-factor solution. This outcome supports the
premise of a unidimensional, overarching construct of psychological flexibility (Bond et
al., 2011). The specific mental processes involved in psychological flexibility are not
fully understood but are proposed to involve attention and short term memory (Kashdan

17

COGNITIVE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FLEXIBILITY AFTER TBI
& Rottenberg, 2010). The behavioural component of psychological flexibility involves
goal setting and planning reflecting higher order executive mental processes.
The ACT model of psychological flexibility implicates a number of distinct mental
processes. The mindfulness component used in ACT engages processes on the left side of
the hexaflex (see Figure 1) such as defusion and contact with the present moment.
Mindfulness has been extensively studied in recent years, as the benefits of mindfulnessbased psychological treatments have been scrutinised. Mindfulness can be described as a
psychological state where an individual regulates their attention to present-moment
awareness and adopts a non-judgemental orientation towards those experiences (Bishop
et al., 2004). The mental processes underlying mindfulness are proposed to include both
focussed and selective attention (Luciano et al., 2014). The heart of mindfulness is the
open awareness and acceptance of ongoing experience in a non-judgemental way
(Cardaciotto, Herbert, Forman, Moitra, & Farrow, 2008; Roozenbeek, Maas, & Menon,
2013).
Neural substrate of psychological flexibility
Generally, the neural substrate of psychological flexibility has received limited
research attention. However, some studies have assessed the practice of mindfulness.
Engagement in mindfulness meditation has been shown to decrease activity in the right
medial prefrontal cortex (Langer & Padrone, 1992) while activation occurs in the dorsal
medial prefrontal cortex and the rostral anterior cingulate cortex (Chiesa & Serretti, 2010;
Hölzel et al., 2007; Vago & Silbersweig, 2012). Using different meditative tasks
(narrative or experiential), activated different and very complex neural networks (Farb et
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al 2007) making it difficult to make generalisations about the neural substrate involved in
meditative tasks.
Other components of psychological flexibility that have received some neuroimaging
research attention is experiential avoidance, which is the mirror opposite of psychological
flexibility. This may provide additional insights into the potential neural basis of
psychological flexibility. For example individuals rated high in neuroticism who engaged
in higher levels of harm avoidance, displayed greater activation of the right anterior
insula when exposed to risk taking decisions than those lower in neuroticism (Levin et
al., 2012). Avoidance of aversive stimuli (losing money) has been found to activate the
medial orbitofrontal cortex (H. Kim, Shimojo, & O'Doherty, 2006).
The identification of a specific neural mechanism associated with psychological
flexibility is complex but it appears to suggest overlap with those associated with
cognitive flexibility (e.g., the prefrontal cortex). However, as there are limited studies,
which have addressed only components of psychological flexibility, it is difficult to draw
strong conclusions about the association with cognitive flexibility. The contextual
approach proposed by ACT, where the individual is viewed within their own
environment, suggests a dynamic process which would indicate a wider neural network
that is currently reported in the literature. Further research into this area is warranted in
order to provide greater clarity of the neural substrate of psychological flexibility.
Mental health implications for impairments in psychological flexibility
Impairments in psychological flexibility have been associated with psychopathology
and measures of psychological flexibility are related to a number of self-report measures
of psychological distress (Bond et al., 2011). This inverse relationship between self-
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reported distress and psychological flexibility has also been established in individuals
with an ABI (Whiting, Deane, Ciarrochi, McLeod, & Simpson, 2015). Acceptance-based
therapies such as ACT have a theoretical foundation in Relational Frame Theory (RFT).
Broadly, RFT posits that language and higher cognition is based on the relationships
humans build between objects (Barnes-Holmes, Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2002;
C. Kim et al., 2011). Rigidity or automaticity (a lack of flexibility) in these relationships
can lead to psychopathology (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, McHugh, & Hayes,
2004).
The link between impairments in psychological flexibility and psychopathology has
been demonstrated across a number of disorders (Chawla & Ostafin, 2007; Kashdan &
Rottenberg, 2010). These have included depression (Bohlmeijer, Fledderus, Rokx, &
Pieterse, 2011), eating disorders (Chiesa & Serretti, 2010; Merwin et al., 2010) and
anxiety (Arch, Eifert, et al., 2012). This reflects similar relationships that have been
established between psychopathology and impairments in cognitive flexibility providing
further evidence of overlap between the constructs.
Measuring psychological flexibility
The measurement of psychological flexibility is undertaken by self-report measures. It
has been suggested this needs to be extended to include observation and implicit
measurement, where the participants are not aware of the outcome of the measure, in
order to give a more thorough assessment of psychological flexibility (Gloster et al.,
2011). Furthermore it is recommended that measures need to cover emotional, cognitive
and behavioural in order to fully capture psychological flexibility across all domains
(Ben-Itzhak, Bluvstein, & Maor, 2014).
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One of the main outcome measures in treatment trials of ACT is the AAQ-II (Bond et
al., 2011) which claims to assess psychological flexibility/inflexibility, though indirectly,
by measuring processes associated with psychological flexibility (Ciarrochi, Bilich, &
Godsell, 2010). Recently, confirmatory factor analysis of the AAQ-II identified
psychological flexibility as a unitary construct that is distinct from other psychological
constructs such as depression and anxiety. It also explained additional variance in
impairment and functionality in a clinical population (Gloster et al., 2011). However, at
least one study has raised questions about the ability of the AAQ-II to discriminate
between psychological flexibility and measures of psychological wellbeing (Wolgast,
2014). It was found that the AAQ-II items were more strongly related to other items of
distress than items that measured acceptance. Wolgast (2014) suggested this is a problem
in how psychological flexibility has been operationalised as it may be a dynamic
psychological process that is not easily captured by static, self-report measures. Such
views also support the contextual nature of psychological flexibility.
The Avoidance and Fusion Questionnaire (AFQ; Schmalz & Murrell, 2010) is a
measure of experiential avoidance which is a major component of psychological
inflexibility. The AFQ has been validated in both child and adolescent populations
(Greco, Lambert, & Baer, 2008) as well as an adult college sample (Schmalz & Murrell,
2010). In the college sample, the AFQ was moderately negatively correlated with the
AAQ-II suggesting they are related but also capture slightly different constructs. The
AFQ is thought to be more representative of cognitive fusion and avoidant behaviours
while the AAQ-II is considered to be a more general measure of acceptance/avoidance.
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As such the AFQ has been recommended for use in conjunction with the AAQ-II as an
outcome measure in ACT treatment trials (Schmalz & Murrell, 2010).
Often in ACT research, the measurement of psychological flexibility involves
adapting existing questionnaires (e.g. AAQ-II) so that the content is specific to targeted
disorders and populations. This enables measurement of the acceptance an individual is
experiencing specific to the particular condition or context. In addition to the generic
AAQ-II, there are now measures of psychological flexibility for health conditions such as
diabetes (Gregg, Callaghan, Hayes, & Glenn-Lawson, 2007) and pain (McCracken,
Vowles, & Eccleston, 2004).
A measure for people with an ABI has recently been validated (Acceptance and
Action Questionnaire for Acquired Brain Injury, AAQ-ABI; (Whiting et al., 2015). The
nine item AAQ-ABI poses questions specifically targeted to address acceptance and
experiential avoidance associated with reactions about having an ABI. The goal is to
assess avoidance and acceptance of thoughts, feelings and behaviours that may arise as a
result of incurring a brain injury (e.g., “I stop doing things when I feel scared about my
brain injury”). The measure has been developed for people with cognitive impairments
and features the use of simplified language and a shorter 5-point Likert scale (as opposed
to a 7-point Likert scale on the AAQ-II).
Treating impairments in psychological flexibility
As discussed there is some research into cognitive flexibility after TBI but few studies
about psychological flexibility which is still in its preliminary stages (Sylvester, 2011;
Whiting, Simpson, Ciarrochi, & McLeod, 2012; Whiting, Simpson, McLeod, Deane, &
Ciarrochi, 2012). ACT treatment trials have a focus on either reducing or increasing a
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behaviour or emotion within a specific context and such changes are thought to be
indicative of psychological flexibility (Levin et al., 2012). For example, a reduction in
smoking behaviour (Bricker, Wyszynski, Comstock, & Heffner, 2013a).
The limited research in brain injury, includes an ACT intervention that was
successfully implemented to increase participation and adaptive functioning in
adolescents and adults (ages 15-59 years) who had acquired their brain injury before the
age of 18 years (82% TBI) (Sylvester, 2011). Although the study found improvements in
psychological flexibility, the self-report measure to assess this outcome had not been
validated. In another study, improvements in psychological flexibility (as measured using
the AAQ-ABI) were achieved using an ACT intervention with two men with a severe
TBI (Whiting, Simpson, Ciarrochi, et al., 2012). Both participants, who displayed
impairments in cognitive flexibility (Trail Making Test), showed improvements in their
psychological flexibility and one participant exhibited significant decreases in
psychological distress, while the second reported an increased participation in valued life
activities.
Broadening the focus to investigate mindfulness-based therapies after TBI reveals
mixed findings. Specifically the treatments used with TBI have included mindfulness
based stress reduction (MBSR) to improve quality of life (Fossati et al., 2003) and to
address mental fatigue (Johansson et al., 2012), though the latter sample included people
who had experienced a stroke (55% of the sample). Mindfulness treatment was found to
be ineffective in improving cognitive impairments, specifically improving attentional
problems in a TBI population (McMillan, Robertson, Brock, & Chorlton, 2002). The
treatment also had no impact on self-reported anxiety or depression levels but it should be
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noted that all pre-treatment scores across the groups were at or below the cut off for
caseness.
A recent randomised controlled trial implemented mindfulness-based cognitive
therapy (MBCT) to treat depression after a TBI (Bédard et al., 2014). Significant
reductions in self-reported depression and improvements in levels of acceptance as
measured on the Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale (Cardaciotto et al., 2008) were found.
The generalisability of this research to the TBI population is confounded by the limited
description of the participants with regard their TBI. No measure of cognitive function or
severity of the TBI, (e.g., PTA or GCS, Glasgow Coma Score), was reported making it
unclear whether this therapy mode might be suitable for those suffering severe to
extremely severe cognitive impairments.
Due to the limited research in treating impairments in psychological flexibility after a
TBI, it is worth drawing on research in other populations in order to clarify its potential
benefits with a TBI population. Empirical outcome research using ACT, which promotes
psychological flexibility as a treatment outcome, in health/clinical psychology has been
growing exponentially. The research has yielded positive results with effect sizes ranging
from .20 to 2.91 at follow up (see Ruiz, 2010 for a recent review). Though the early
studies comparing ACT and CBT tended to lack experimental rigour (Forman et al.,
2012), a meta-analysis comparing ACT with CBT found that ACT performed better than
CBT on outcome measures in 69% (11 out of 16) of the studies in the review (Ruiz,
2012). Other studies have indicated that ACT produced similar outcomes to CBT in
anxiety disorders though the mechanisms of change maybe different (Arch, Eifert, et al.,
2012).
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ACT has been used successfully with a range of different populations including
psychotic patients (Bach & Hayes, 2002) and chronic pain clients (Dahl, Wilson, &
Nilsson, 2004). It has also proved to be efficacious for people presenting with anxiety and
depression (Forman, Herbert, Moitra, Yeomans, & Geller, 2007) and with chronic health
problems such as diabetes (Gregg et al., 2007) and tinnitus (Westin, Hayes, & Andersson,
2008). The effectiveness of ACT with chronic health conditions suggests it may be
suitable for dealing with the complex adjustment process post TBI as types of chronic
health conditions studies also require acceptance of persistent and uncontrollable
symptoms similar to what is required after a TBI.

Commonalities and Differences between Cognitive and Psychological Flexibility
The review suggests that overall, psychological flexibility is not wholly dependent upon
cognitive flexibility (see Table 2 for a summary). The process of refining the construct of
psychological flexibility though, is still a work in progress and the conceptualisation may
tighten over time. Cognitive flexibility has a much larger and well-established evidence
base than psychological flexibility which as a construct has mainly been derived from the
ACT movement. Although, Kashdan and Rottenberg (2010) suggest that psychological
flexibility has existed for over fifty decades but possibly know by different names such as
ego-resiliency and self-regulation. On an definitional level, psychological flexibility
appears to be more abstract but on investigation, cognitive flexibility for functional
measurement purposes has been reduced to shift setting but tends to mirror the more
abstract definition of psychological flexibility (Ionescu, 2012).
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The current literature suggests there were both commonalities and differences in the
conceptualisation of the two constructs. Central to both is the notion of behavioural
change (whether an action or a thought) in response to environmental changes. A notable
conceptual difference between the two constructs appears to be around the components of
acceptance and the self-as-context. Cognitive flexibility involves adapting to changing
environmental cues, while psychological flexibility encompasses more. Individuals are
also able to see themselves as separate from their experiences and emotions and when it
is optimal, are able to sit and accept these experiences rather than engaging in
behavioural change or experiential avoidance.
(Insert Table 2 about here)
There is also overlap in the constituent mental processes (e.g., attention), however
initial research indicates that psychological flexibility appears to involve a broader range
of mental processes. Thirdly, more research has investigated the neural substrate of
cognitive flexibility, with key areas of the frontal lobes and the complex connections
involved activating a wider network with increased complexity of the task. Initial work
done in the areas of psychological flexibility suggests that various processes are
distributed quite widely over the brain, activating additional areas to those identified in
cognitive flexibility. This may mean that acceptance-based therapies such as ACT are
lower in cognitive demand as they rely less heavily on cognitive functions commonly
affected by the brain injury such as shifting response set and adapting to feedback (Heled
et al., 2012; McDonald et al., 2002; Niemeier et al., 2007).
In terms of assessment, investigations into cognitive flexibility have rested on
objective measures, although questions about the ecological validity of such measures in
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their prediction of functioning outside the testing environment have been raised (Burgess
et al., 2006). Operationalising cognitive flexibility from these task-related measures that
have used a reductionist approach, fails to take into account the broader context in which
the behaviour occurs. The self-report measures of cognitive flexibility are confined to
specific applications in the area of cognitive therapy and have limited overlap with
objective measures of cognitive flexibility (Johnco et al., 2014). Psychological flexibility
self-report measures are contextually based but are often focussed on flexibility around a
specific issue or disorder and no objective ways to measure psychological flexibility have
been developed to date.
Other commonalities between the two constructs arises from the mental health
implications of impairment in either domain. There is a strong association between
psychopathology and impairments in either domain which has been well documented
across a range of disorders. Interventions which address impairments in these areas
indicate some differences. Cognitive remediation and pharmacological interventions have
been found to be effective in treating impairments in cognitive flexibility while
psychological flexibility is increased through psychotherapy interventions, specifically
acceptance-base therapies. There is no research into how psychopathology and
impairments in both domains interact or, whether ACT interventions to treat
psychopathology result in increased cognitive flexibility. Both areas are in need of further
investigation.
Finally, there are a small number of studies that have explored the association between
the two constructs. One study found cognitive inflexibility (measured by self-report) was
positively related to experiential avoidance (measured by the Acceptance and Action
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Questionnaire) in a sample of young women suffering from interpersonal victimisation
(Palm & Follette, 2011). Experiential avoidance fully mediated the relationship between
cognitive flexibility and measures of psychological distress. The authors suggested that
an inability to think flexibly resulted in higher levels of psychological distress through
increased experiential avoidance. Though this study found an association between the
two constructs, the measure of cognitive flexibility utilised was the Cognitive Flexibility
Scale (CFS: Martin & Rubin, 1995). The CFS assesses a person’s awareness of thoughts
and behaviours for a given situation and the willingness to consider alternatives. A recent
validation of the CFS found weak or no relationship with neuropsychological measures of
cognitive flexibility (Johnco et al., 2014). This raises questions about whether the taskrelated or the self-report measures of cognitive flexibility are adequately capturing
cognitive flexibility.
Other research providing some tenuous links between cognitive and psychological
flexibility involves implementing mindfulness to improve cognitive ability. When studied
in healthy populations, mindfulness has been associated with improved executive control
(Teper & Inzlicht, 2013) and increased cognitive flexibility, as measured by Stroop tasks
(Moore & Malinowski, 2009). Specifically, individuals who engaged in meditation made
fewer errors on the Stroop and path analysis showed that this effect was mediated by
increased emotional acceptance (Teper & Inzlicht, 2013). Though attention has been
found to improve after undertaking short term mindfulness training, other components of
executive control such as cognitive flexibility (as measured by task-based tests) did not
significantly improve (Semple, 2010). In a systematic review encompassing 23 studies, it
was concluded there is some support that the regular practice of mindfulness enhances
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cognitive function but specific domains such as cognitive flexibility were not described
(Chiesa, Calati, & Serretti, 2011).
The link between mindfulness, psychopathology and cognitive flexibility has recently
been reported (Fledderus et al., 2013). Partial improvements in cognitive flexibility (as
assessed by the Stroop test) were found after practicing mindfulness or focussed
relaxation with individuals diagnosed with generalised anxiety disorder (GAD). In
addition state anxiety also decreased after the intervention (in both mindfulness and
relaxation groups) and this was significantly different to those individuals with GAD who
engaged in a thought wandering task.
Although direct comparisons of cognitive and psychological flexibility are rare,
available studies suggest associations between component processes of psychological
flexibility with aspects of cognitive flexibility. There is still a need to further quantify this
relationship in healthy, clinical and TBI populations. The implications of impairments in
cognitive and psychological flexibility in implementing acceptance-based therapies with
individuals with a TBI will now be explored and discussed.

Implications for treatment after TBI
Impaired cognitive and psychological flexibility after a TBI often results in the use of
ineffective coping strategies to manage the post injury changes (Krpan, Levine, Stuss, &
Dawson, 2007). Impaired flexibility can contribute to behavioural problems, emotional
difficulties and provide challenges in returning to pre injury functioning (Dilley & Avent,
2011). The impact of psychological distress after a TBI in conjunction with cognitive
impairments can create challenges for recovery. It has been proposed that people need to
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redefine themselves after their TBI by incorporating both their cognitive and physical
limitations (Whitehouse, 1994).
Treatments to address psychological distress after a TBI have included CBT and
though reviews have shown mixed results overall CBT is considered efficacious
(Cattelani et al., 2010; Fann, Hart, & Schomer, 2009; Wolgast, 2014). There has been
recent evidence that CBT can successfully be modified to account for the cognitive
impairments after a severe TBI (Simpson et al., 2011). One criticism of CBT for
individuals with cognitive impairment is the requirement to engage in cognitive
restructuring that involves challenging unhelpful thought processes (Kinney, 2001). This
process requires the individual to simultaneously hold the thought in their head, seek
alternative thoughts and reason and rationalise in order to generate a more appropriate
response. These strategies are particularly difficult to implement for those with cognitive
impairments (Anson & Ponsford, 2006). This process also involves cognitive defusion,
an important mediator of change identified for both CBT and ACT albeit in a non TBI
populations (Arch, Wolitzky-Taylor, Eifert, & Craske, 2012; Forman et al., 2012).
Cognitive defusion is a way of allowing the individual to focus on their thinking
processes rather than the content or meaning of a thought often resulting in reduced
feelings of distress. The mechanisms by which CBT and ACT implement cognitive
defusion are theorised to be different and these differences particularly from an ACT
perspective offer opportunities for individuals to be able to compensate for cognitive
impairments (Coetzer, 2013).
In ACT the approach to cognitive defusion removes the need for intellectualising and
reasoning. It allows the person to create distance from their thoughts without engaging in
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them and the processes used can be quite concrete. Examples exercises include the
repetition of a word over and over again (e.g. Milk, milk, milk exercise) or saying the
word aloud using a silly voice. These exercises demonstrate how the impact and
perceptions of particular language can be changed helping people recognise the
possibility of modifying the emotional valence of language.
Individuals with a severe TBI are likely to be quite concrete in their thinking and have
difficulty understanding abstract concepts (Schretlen & Shapiro, 2003). Other strategies
involve creating a physical or concrete presence for the thought, “physicalising the
thought”, where the person is asked to give the thought physical attributes such as shape,
colour and texture. The use of metaphors also allows the therapist to move the abstract to
the concrete in order to create defusion. An example is the “Passengers on a Bus”
metaphor which is used to demonstrate how thoughts, memories and past experiences can
cause you to detour from moving towards what you value. The individual is represented
by the bus driver, and the internal thoughts, feelings and past experiences are the
passengers who become increasingly vocal when you move towards your valued
direction. When you detour or turn away from the valued direction, the voices quieten.
Both pictorial representations of the metaphor can be presented to the client, or it can be
role played in small groups. This multimodal approach to therapy allows the therapist to
make modifications to account for individual differences in cognitive impairment.
Another area where ACT may be useful after a TBI is the process of accepting
difficult thoughts and emotions. The thoughts experienced by the person with a severe
TBI may not be irrational or be appropriate for challenging in the context of them having
undergone a significant event which will have a lasting impact on the rest of their life
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(deGuise et al., 2008). ACT shows the person how to sit with distressing thoughts and
emotions but still engage in values based behaviour, this particular facet of ACT has been
used successfully with chronic, unchangeable health conditions such as diabetes and
fibromyalgia (Luciano et al., 2014; Makvand Hoseini, Rezaei, & Azadi, 2014b).
There are a number of similarities between ACT and other therapy modalities that
have proved efficacious after TBI, providing additional evidence that ACT is likely to be
appropriate for this population group. Ingredients of motivational interviewing, which has
been successfully used with a TBI sample (Hsieh et al., 2012), include a focus on values
guided behaviour are ACT-consistent (Bricker & Tollison, 2011). Similarly, other key
therapy components including behavioural activation, building of awareness and
experiential acceptance are common across a number of therapy modalities including
ACT and have been shown to be an effective components for change (Arch, WolitzkyTaylor, et al., 2012; Bond & Bunce, 2000; Forman et al., 2012; Hesser, Westin, &
Andersson, 2014; Wetherell et al., 2011).

Investigations of individual components of ACT further, suggest that it is consistent
with the post TBI adjustment process. Post-TBI adjustment has been described as
involving emotional acceptance of the impairments into the patient’s self-concept in
addition to adaptations to behaviour and successful social reintegration (Antonak, Livneh,
& Antonak, 1993). This adjustment seems to reflect components of psychological
flexibility, specifically the acceptance and ‘self–as-context’ processes of the
psychological flexibility model (Hayes et al., 2006). Self-as-context requires a person to
distinguish themselves as separate from their thoughts or feelings which helps to create
awareness and reduce the attachment to the conceptualised self. A person may have a
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conceptualised self as being ‘the comedian’ in social situations, always making people
laugh. After the injury, due to their cognitive impairments, they are no longer able to play
this role resulting in avoidance of social situations with increased feelings of sadness and
loss. Thus, impairments to self-concept commonly seen following TBI would require this
element of psychological flexibility to increase awareness and further facilitate
adjustment post injury as the individual comes to terms with their post injury self. These
components of psychological flexibility may be the defining differences from cognitive
flexibility and indicate why psychological interventions can be effective after a TBI.
Self-awareness may also be an important consideration in the relationship between
cognitive and psychological flexibility. Impairments in awareness after a TBI are not
consistent across all domains with lack of awareness being more evident in
emotional/behavioural and cognitive domains (Fann et al., 2009). Impaired selfawareness impacts on engagement in rehabilitation (Vanderploeg et al., 2008), improves
over time after sustaining an injury (Hibbard, Gordon, Egelko, & Langer, 1987;
Schrijnemaekers, Smeets, Ponds, van Heugten, & Rasquin, 2013; Sherer et al., 2003) and
is related to severity of injury (Morton & Barker, 2010). Increased self-awareness after a
TBI leads to more favourable rehabilitation outcomes (Walter, Palmieri, & Gunstad,
2010), such as improved participation and social integration (Jennifer M Fleming et al.,
2006) despite often resulting in increased emotional distress (Chervinsky et al., 1998;
McBrinn et al., 2008; Schrijnemaekers et al., 2013; Sherer et al., 2003). Improvement in
behavioural domains in the presence of emotional distress is suggestive of psychological
flexibility. Individuals are able to engage in meaningful behaviour such as participation
in valued activities despite being aware of and distressed by their post TBI impairments.
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As self-awareness increases, individuals are able to accept and incorporate their
impairments into their new identity and eventually move on with their life.
Although a relationship between psychological flexibility and self-awareness is
theoretically probable, no specific research was identified that had directly investigated
these associations. The practice of mindfulness, used to engage core processes in ACT, is
proposed to facilitate self-awareness (Vago & Silbersweig, 2012) but this relationship has
yet to be explored in a sample with TBI. There are several possibilities about how the
relationship between self-awareness and psychological flexibility might manifest itself.
The most likely relationship seems to be that lower self-awareness would be
associated with lower psychological flexibility (as indirectly evidenced by the
relationship between cognitive flexibility and self-awareness). Is it possible that some
individuals could have low self-awareness and low cognitive flexibility but still be able to
develop psychological flexibility? By way of example, an individual may have low
awareness of their increased irritability and anger following TBI despite it being apparent
to family and friends. This behaviour is associated with low cognitive flexibility,
reflected in their difficulty with changing perspectives (or set) and coming up with
alternative ways of addressing problems. However, the person may be open to observing
their emotions and sitting with them more thoughtfully despite having impaired cognitive
flexibility. There is potential to learn new ways to do this (perhaps through mindfulness
training). Under these circumstances there is currently low self-awareness of emotional
responding, low cognitive flexibility in being able to change perspectives or come up
with alternatives to problems (which might elicit angry responses), but an openness to
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internal experiences with the potential for these skills to improve further (psychological
flexibility).
In summary, in a TBI population, it appears that impaired cognitive flexibility can lead
to poor problem solving and the inability to shift to alternative solutions. Impaired
cognitive flexibility is also associated with poor awareness of the deficits that occur after
the brain injury. Poor psychological flexibility is evidenced by responding with the same
emotional response (usually negative) to different situations. Improvements in selfawareness results in better social and vocational outcomes but is often accompanied by
increased psychological distress secondary to greater awareness of deficits. Despite
overlaps in definition and research findings, it is unclear whether those who have
impaired cognitive flexibility are able to develop psychological flexibility and whether
this is mediated or linked to self-awareness of deficits after a TBI. It is possible that
increased psychological flexibility (e.g., acceptance of thoughts and feelings) might
mitigate the secondary negative effects of improved self-awareness. It remains for future
research to test these potential relationships but the above theoretical and empirical
considerations highlight the probable relationships between self-awareness, cognitive and
psychological flexibility.
Therapy modification to account for cognitive impairments
The use of acceptance-based therapies, specifically ACT, after an ABI has received
two comprehensive reviews (Kangas & McDonald, 2011; Soo et al., 2011). As a result,
recommendations have been made on how to best delivery ACT to account for the
cognitive impairments displayed after a brain injury, though it should be noted one
review was in the context of mild-moderate brain injury (Kangas & McDonald, 2011). A
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number of these recommendations reflect practical suggestions that also apply to the
modification of traditional CBT including provision of memory aids such as written
notes, repeating and revising information and involving a family member (Hibbard et al.,
1987; Khan-Bourne & Brown, 2003; Klonoff, 2010; Ponsford, Sloan, & Snow, 2013;
Whitehouse, 1994). Table 3 provides an outline of existing recommendations for therapy
modifications for both cognitive therapy and CBT. A more comprehensive review of
cognitive impairments commonly displayed after brain injury with corresponding
strategies and therapy adaptations is provided by Ownsworth (2014).
(insert Table 3 about here)
Therapy modifications that are more specific to ACT (see Table 3) include
maintaining a therapy focus on the behavioural change processes (see Figure 1) such as
identification of values and committed action (Soo et al., 2011). ACT excels at
transforming the abstract into the concrete. There is an extensive library of metaphors
available enabling the opportunity to select metaphors which are both tangible and
personally meaningful for the individual. A number of metaphors have been captured in
pictures or created into short videos by members of the ACT community, making them
readily accessible for therapists. It is also recommended that therapists using ACT
demonstrate flexibility by allowing the person with a TBI to develop their own meaning
from the metaphor.

Conclusion
Psychological flexibility appears to be linked to health and wellbeing and is a goal of
treatment for acceptance-based therapies such as ACT. This review has identified an
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overlap between the constructs of cognitive and psychological flexibility at several
levels; 1. There is a significant definitional and conceptual overlap; 2. There is also
preliminary evidence of overlap in terms of associations with neurological functioning
and the location of brain activity associated with tasks that demand cognitive and
psychological flexibility; 3. Impairments in both constructs have demonstrated a complex
relationship with psychopathology; 4. Extant measures have some overlap, particularly
the self-report measures of cognitive and psychological flexibility but less so the
neuropsychological measures and finally; 5. Variables that have been associated with
important outcomes following TBI (e.g., self-awareness) have both theoretical and some
empirical links to both constructs.
Both cognitive and psychological flexibility ideally lead to a change in behaviour
(either a thought or an action) in response to environmental change. When a broader
definition of cognitive flexibility is considered, it is more than simply the ability to
switch between tasks. It incorporates additional cognitive processes including attention,
memory, inhibition and other processes such as perception and previous knowledge
which also interact with environmental processes (Ionescu, 2012). This indicates an even
closer alignment with the broader definition of psychological flexibility in that it
encompasses context, both internal and external to the person, in which the change
occurs. This suggests they may be similar constructs but currently being viewed from
different psychological perspectives.
It is well established that people with a TBI often suffer from cognitive inflexibility as
a result of damage to their executive processes but research also indicates that they
respond positively to different forms of psychological therapy (Bombardier et al., 2009;
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Hodgson, McDonald, Tate, & Gertler, 2005; Hsieh et al., 2012; Medd & Tate, 2000;
Simpson et al., 2011). If increases in psychological flexibility are central to
improvements in such therapy outcomes, this suggests that cognitive flexibility, as
measured by task-based neuropsychological tests, may not be a prerequisite for
psychological flexibility. Furthermore, performance on the task-based tests currently
being used to operationalise cognitive flexibility may not be a good predictor of ability to
successfully engage in therapy. This provides additional support for the concerns raised
about the poor ecological validity of these types of measures (Burgess et al., 2006).
Preliminary research into therapies, such as ACT which specifically promote
psychological flexibility, have shown encouraging results in samples with cognitive
impairments (Sylvester, 2011; Whiting, Simpson, Ciarrochi, et al., 2012). Also,
acceptance-based therapies appear to be adaptable in order to account for the impairments
evident after a severe TBI. Pragmatically, this would suggest that people with a TBI can
“accept their negative emotions” and not “avoid them” (indicating psychological
flexibility) even though they may have impairments in their cognitive flexibility. The
influence of self-awareness may also need to be considered as it is associated with
cognitive flexibility and, improved self-awareness appears to be an important factor for
active engagement in therapy. This might suggest that increases in self-awareness may be
associated with increased psychological flexibility or self-awareness plays a mediating
role in the relationship. Further research into this relationship may also contribute to our
understanding of how cognitive and psychological flexibility are related.
Further research into therapies which claim to improve psychological flexibility, such
as ACT, need to be undertaken in TBI populations. It may also be beneficial to
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understand how each component of the ACT hexaflex contributes to the development of
psychological flexibility and how the processes interact. Investigations into whether
approaches to compensate for impairments in cognitive inflexibility have the ability to
promote “acceptance”, an important component of psychological flexibility after TBI, are
warranted. Overall, there is a need for research into cognitive rehabilitation or treatment
studies addressing impairments into cognitive flexibility and other executive functioning,
as there is a paucity of research in this area.
Finally, undertaking further validation studies between both neuropsychological and
self-report measures of cognitive flexibility and measures of psychological flexibility
may assist in improving our understanding of how these two constructs are related and
interact. What we might be seeing is that flexibility in psychology exists not on a
continuum but as more of a network. Cognitive flexibility maybe impaired, as measured
on neuropsychological tests as well as self-report measures, but the individual is still able
to demonstrate psychological flexibility by adapting and responding appropriately in
response to both internal and external experiences due to contextual influences.
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Figure 1. Hexaflex: Model of psychological flexibility
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Table 1. Definitions of the components of the ACT hexaflex
Hexaflex component
Acceptance
Defusion

Self-as-context

Contact with the
present moment
Values

Committed action

Definition
The opening up and making room for distressing thoughts, emotions
or experiences so that there is no longer an ongoing struggle
The process of creating some separation from distressing thoughts,
emotions or experiences and changing the function of the thought
rather than the content
Or ‘the observing self’, seeks to demonstrate that a component of us
is always the same, regardless of what is changing with regard to our
feelings or experiences.
Involves being in the here and now, being more behaviourally
flexible and consciously connecting with what is happening in that
moment.
Are unique to each individual and provide the framework for goal
setting and engaging in committed action in line with these
personally relevant principles.
Involves either persisting or altering behaviour that is values based.
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Table 2. A summary of the constructs of cognitive and psychological flexibility

Construct

Cognitive Flexibility

Domain/discipline
Clinical populations

Neuropsychology/neuroscience
Studied in brain damaged and other
clinical populations

Definition

Restricted and broad definitions
provided
Neuropsychological testing
Neuroimaging

Investigation of
neurophysiology
Mental processes

Neural substrate
(regions of the brain)
Clinical implications for
therapy

Association with
psychopathology
How the construct is
measured
Assessment approaches

a

Shifting set, attention, goal
identification, using feedback,
monitoring, perception and stored
knowledge
Neural basis well defined
activation in prefrontal cortex
None in occipital regions
Well established strong relationships
with psychopathology
Antecedent, maintaining factor and
consequence of psychopathology
Schizophrenia, depression, anxiety,
eating disorders, bipolar disorder
Objective neuropsychological tasks
Self-report measures
Wisconsin Cart Sort Test (WCST)a
Trail Making Testb
Similarities (WAIS-IV)c
Stroop testd
Cognitive Flexibility Scale (CFS)e
Cognitive Flexibility Inventory (CFI)f

Psychological Flexibility
Clinical psychology
Studied in both clinical,
health and nonclinical
populations
Broader definition – includes
acceptance
Self-report measures
Correlational studies
Limited neuroimaging
Limited research but appears
to involve, attention,
working memory and
executive functions
Neural basis less clearly
specified
Some elements established
Emerging strong relationships
with psychopathology and
chronic health conditions
Depression, eating disorders
and anxiety
Self-report measures
Acceptance and Action
Questionnaire (AAQ-II)g
and variations

(Heaton et al., 1981); b(Reitan, 1958); c(Wechsler, 2008); d(Strauss et al., 2006); e(Martin & Rubin, 1995);
(Dennis & Vander Wal, 2010); g(Bond et al., 2011).

f
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Table 3. Suggested therapy modifications to account for cognitive impairments
Strategy

Reference

General Strategies for CBT & ACT
Shorten length of the sessions
Using memory aids e.g. written notes, cue cards, recordings
Simplification of tasks
Increased frequency of sessions
Summarising & reviewing content regularly
Focus on behavioural techniques
Involve a family member in the therapy process
Initial sessions focus on educating, normalising and validating
Training to enhance other skills e.g. social skills
Concrete examples as opposed to abstract
Modelling of assignments by therapist and patient
Highly structured session content
Repetition and slowed presentation
Being directive in the discussions & with therapy

3, 5, 8
2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8
1, 4, 8
5
1, 2, 4, 8
1,7
1, 2, 3, 5, 8
6, 7
7, 8
3, 4, 7, 8
1
2, 8
2, 3, 7, 8
3, 4

ACT Specific
Using personally relevant and concrete metaphors
Engaging in experiential exercises including role playing
Defusion techniques that are concrete e.g. Physicalising the thought
Focus on behavioural activation components
Providing tangible ideas e.g. Card Sorting Task from the Survey of
Life Principles 2.2 (Ciarrochi & Bailey, 2008)
Promotion of values based, goal directed behaviour
Shorter mindfulness exercises
Allowing client to develop their own meaning from metaphors

9
9
9
7
9
9
10

Notes. 1(Hibbard et al., 1987), 2(Whitehouse, 1994), 3 (Ponsford et al., 2013), 4 (Klonoff, 2010),
5
(Khan-Bourne & Brown, 2003), 6(Kangas & McDonald, 2011), 7(Soo et al., 2011), 8(Ownsworth,
2014), 9(Whiting, Simpson, McLeod, et al., 2012), 10(Bédard et al., 2014).
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